

CABINET RESPONSIBILITY AS AN INSTITUTIONAL, PROCEDURAL, POLITICAL AND BEHAVIORAL ATTRIBUTE OF SEMI-PRESIDENTIALISM IN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES

The article is dedicated to analyzing the phenomenon and components of parliamentary responsibility of governmental cabinets as an institutional, procedural, political and behavioral attribute of semi-presidentialism in European countries. It is emphasized that parliamentary responsibility of governmental cabinet is a systemic and immanent feature of semi-presidentialism and can be reflected mainly through the procedures of parliamentary votes of no confidence in running governmental cabinets and optionally through the procedures of parliamentary votes of confidence in running governmental cabinets. These procedures were characterized and clustered on the basis of a comparative analysis of European semi-presidential countries. Additionally, the study analyzes the electoral and non-electoral factors of parliamentary responsibility of governmental cabinets in the context of semi-presidentialism in Europe.

Keywords: semi-presidentialism, government, governmental cabinet, parliamentary responsibility of governmental cabinet, vote of no confidence in running cabinet, vote of confidence in running cabinet, European countries.

ODPOWIEDZIALNOŚĆ GABINETU JAKO INSTYTUCJONALNY, PROCEDURALNY, POLITYCZNY I BEHAWIORALNY ATRYBUT PÓŁPREZYDENCJALNOŚCI W KRAJACH EUROPEJSKICH

Artykuł poświęcony jest analizie zjawiska i elementów odpowiedzialności parlamentarnej gabinetów rządowych jako instytucjonalnego, proceduralnego, politycznego i behawioralnego atrybutu semiprezydenckiego w krajach europejskich. Podkreśla się, że parlamentarna odpowiedzialność gabinetu rządowego jest systemową i immanentną cechą semiprezydencjonalizmu i może być odzwierciedlona głównie w procedurach parlamentarnych wotum nieufności dla sprawowania rządów i fakultatywnie poprzez procedury parlamentarnych wotum nieufności dla sprawowania rządów. szafki. Procedury te zostały scharakteryzowane i pogrupowane na podstawie analizy porównawczej europejskich krajów półprezydenckich. Ponadto w opracowaniu przeanalizowano wyborcze i pozawyborcze czynniki odpowiedzialności parlamentarnej gabinetów rządowych w kontekście semiprezydenckiego w Europie.

Słowa kluczowe: semiprezydencja, rząd, gabinet rządowy, odpowiedzialność parlamentarna gabinetu rządowego, wotum nieufności dla rządu, wotum zaufania dla rządu, kraje europejskie.

ВІДПОВІДАЛЬНІСТЬ УРЯДОВИХ КАБІНЕТІВ ЯК ІНСТИТУЦІЙНИЙ, ПРОЦЕСУАЛЬНИЙ, ПОЛІТИЧНИЙ І ПОВЕДІНКОВИЙ АТРИБУТ НАПІВПРЕЗИДЕНТАЛІЗМУ В КРАЇНАХ ЄВРОПИ

У статті проаналізовано феномен і складові парламентської відповідальності урядових кабінетів як інституційного, процесуального, політичного і поведінкового атрибуту напівпрезиденталізму в країнах Європи. Наголошено, що парламентська відповідальність урядового кабінету є системною іманентною ознакою напівпрезиденталізму і може бути відображена головню через процедури парламентських вотумів недовіри чинним урядовим кабінетам, а також опціонально через процедури парламентських вотумів довіри чинним урядовим кабінетам. Ці процедури було схарактеризовано і кластеризовано на підставі порівняльного аналізу напівпрезидентських країн Європи. Додатково дослідженні проаналізовано електоральні і неелекторальні чинники парламентської відповідальності урядових кабінетів в умовах напівпрезиденталізму у Європі.

Ключові слова: напівпрезиденталізм, уряд, урядовий кабінет, парламентська відповідальність урядового кабінету, вотум недовіри чинному кабінету, вотум довіри чинному кабінету, країни Європи.

Semi-presidentialism is a system of government with the institution of fixed-term elected president and the position of prime minister who heads governmental cabinet, which is collectively responsible (i.e., may be terminated entirely) at least to parliament or both to parliament and president (depending on the type of semi-presidentialism). Accordingly, as it is clear from the definition and attribution of semi-presidentialism, it is important to take into account the specifics of the responsibility of the executive and governmental cabinets in this context. The fact is that the terminal or discretionary patterns of functioning of governmental cabinets under semi-presidentialism are largely derived from the influence and powers of the heads of state (presidents), although, on the other hand, these patterns are necessarily dependent on the legislature and thus determine the analyzed system of government quite specifically¹. The explanation is that voters theoretically (but not always actually) have two channels and mechanisms for controlling governmental cabinets and the executive, namely the first or initial one

¹ Kang S.-G., *Government Formation and Termination in European Democracies with Presidential Heads of State*, Wyd. University of Rochester 2008.; Kang S.-G., The influence of presidential heads of state on government formation in European democracies: Empirical evidence, *European Journal of Political Research* 2009, vol. 48, nr. 4, s. 543–572.

through the legislature and the second or alternative one through the president. As a result, the study of the influence of both the legislature and the president on the responsibility of governmental cabinets under semi-presidentialism is important normatively and practically, as it can certify institutional, procedural, political and behavioral attributes of one or another type of constitutional design. This is especially valuable through the prism of taking into account party determination and composition of the heads of state, parliaments and governmental cabinets². At the same time, it is noticeable that the nature of governmental cabinets under semi-presidentialism is or may be conflicting or dualistic one (based on the contradiction of the mandates of the presidents and the legislatures), and therefore can lead to exceptional consequences, including involvement of non-party ministers in cabinets³.

This regulates that the responsibility of cabinets under semi-presidentialism is dynamic one and is based on the interaction between the president and the legislature (i.e., between parliamentary parties), as well as between the results of their elections⁴, which can cause/intensify conflicts within the executive and the constitutional ambiguity of semi-presidentialism in general⁵. This is determined by the fact that semi-presidentialism is characterized by the participation of the president and parliament in the election/formation and/or responsibility of governmental cabinet, as a result of which their decisions to appoint a governmental cabinet can be modeled as a two-way game on arrangements about this⁶. Complementing this situation in the conditions of semi-presidentialism is the consideration of the factor of who can dismiss governmental cabinet – either only the parliament or both the parliament and the president. When the right to terminate a governmental cabinet belongs only to parliament, then the president is faced with an “inter-institutional choice”: either to appoint a prime minister who reflects the preferences of the legislature, or to appoint a close candidate for prime minister and to be prepared that the legislature will be able to dismiss this prime minister at any time and change the president-oriented governmental cabinet. Quite different strategies emerge when the president and

² Austen-Smith D., Banks J., Elections, Coalitions, and Legislative Outcomes, “*American Political Science Review*” 1988, vol. 82, s. 405–422.; Baron D., A Spatial Bargaining Theory of Government Formation in Parliamentary Systems, “*American Political Science Review*” 1991, vol. 85, nr. 1, s. 137–164.; Baron D., Government Formation and Endogenous Parties, “*American Political Science Review*” 1993, vol. 87, nr. 1, s. 34–47.; Baron D., Diermeier D., Elections, Governments, and Parliaments in Proportional Representation Systems, “*Quarterly Journal of Economics*” 2001, vol. 116, nr. 3, s. 933–967.; Laver M., Shepsle K., Coalitions and Cabinet Government, “*American Political Science Review*” 1990, vol. 84, nr. 3, s. 873–890.; Sened I., A Model of Coalition Formation: Theory and Evidence, “*Journal of Politics*” 1996, vol. 58, nr. 2, s. 350–372.

³ Schleiter S., Morgan-Jones E., *Semi-Presidential Regimes: Providing Flexibility or Generating Representation and Governance Problems?*, Presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, 1–4 September 2005, 29 s.; Amorim Neto O., Strøm K., *Breaking the Chain: The Impact of Presidents on Cabinet Selection in European Parliamentary Democracies*, Paper prepared for delivery at the Conference on Electoral Reform in Brazil in Comparative Perspective, Rio de Janeiro, 2002.; Amorim Neto O., Strøm K., *Breaking the Parliamentary Chain of Delegation: Presidents and Non-partisan Cabinet Members in European Democracies*, “*British Journal of Political Science*” 2006, vol. 36, nr. 4, s. 619–643.; Almeida A., Cho S.-J., *Presidential Power and Cabinet Membership Under Semi-Presidentialism*, Paper Presented at the Midwest Political Science Association Annual Meeting, Chicago, 3–6 April, 2003, 42 s.

⁴ Kang S.-G., *Government Formation and Termination in European Democracies with Presidential Heads of State*, Wyd. University of Rochester 2008.

⁵ Movchan U., Dualizm vykonavchoi vlady: problema rozpodilu povnovazhen u napriy prezidentskykh systemakh, “*Visnyk Kharkivskoho natsionalnogo universytetu imeni V.N. Karazhina. Seriya: Pytannia politolohii*” 2011, nr. 984, s. 102–108.

⁶ Protsyk O., Prime ministers’ identity in semi-presidential regimes: Constitutional norms and cabinet formation outcomes, “*European Journal of Political Research*” 2005, vol. 44, nr. 5, s. 724.

parliament can unilaterally dismiss the prime minister and his or her cabinet. As the president has the power to dismiss governmental cabinet, this gives him or her an advantage in the cabinet formation process. Nevertheless, ensuring the election of a more parliamentary acceptable prime minister and cabinet does not necessarily guarantee their long term, since the loyalty to parliament may prove to be threatened by the need to live up to the president's hopes⁷. The situations outlined above are complicated by the threat of a permanent review and redistribution of powers between prime ministers and presidents, especially in the institutional cases that have only recently become semi-presidential ones⁸. Although, controversially, only the parliament is obliged to prematurely terminate the powers of governmental cabinets and its prime ministers in all cases of semi-presidentialism, that summarizes the bilateral nature of the conflict of interest over the responsibility of cabinets under the dualism of the executive in semi-presidentialism. By this logic, the delineation of cabinets under semi-presidentialism is its location within the continuum between the right to nominate/appoint the prime minister and the right to dismiss the cabinet and its prime minister⁹.

As for the responsibility of governmental cabinets in the conditions of semi-presidentialism, it is necessary to speak about the outlined issue (as well as about the peculiarities of governmental cabinets' formation under semi-presidentialism) from the standpoint of political, behavioral, institutional and procedural dimensions¹⁰. However, hypothesizing about the political, behavioral, procedural and institutional dimensions of cabinet responsibility and early terminations of governmental cabinets under semi-presidentialism is multifaceted and occurs within taking into account competitive non-electoral and electoral risks (in particular, in the case of early parliamentary and, to a lesser extent, presidential elections). Non-electoral risks (institutional, procedural, political and behavioral ones) traditionally involve perturbation of party/inter-party control of governmental cabinets based on the change or no change of prime ministerial parties, supplemented by the influence of presidential and parliamentary powers to dismiss cabinets¹¹. Thus, in European semi-presidential countries, where the president (along with the parliament – by the definition of semi-presidentialism) has the power to dismiss governmental cabinet (as of December 2020, such European countries were Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Iceland and Russia, and earlier/historically Armenia, Croatia, Georgia, Portugal, Ukraine) or

⁷ Protsyk O., Prime ministers' identity in semi-presidential regimes: Constitutional norms and cabinet formation outcomes, *European Journal of Political Research* 2005, vol. 44, nr. 5, s. 726–727.

⁸ Elgie R., *The Politics of Semi-Presidentialism*, [w:] Elgie R. (ed.), *Semi-Presidentialism in Europe*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 1999, s. 1–21.; Elgie R., *Semi-Presidentialism and Comparative Institutional Engineering*, [w:] Elgie R. (ed.), *Semi-Presidentialism in Europe*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 1999, s. 281–299.; Taras R., *Postcommunist Presidents*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1997.

⁹ Protsyk O., Prime ministers' identity in semi-presidential regimes: Constitutional norms and cabinet formation outcomes, *European Journal of Political Research* 2005, vol. 44, nr. 5, s. 721–748.

¹⁰ Fernandes J., Magalhães S., Government survival in semi-presidential regimes, *European Journal of Political Research* 2016, vol. 55, nr. 1, s. 61–80.; Groffman B., Van Roozendaal S., Modelling cabinet durability and termination, *British Journal of Political Science* 1997, vol. 27, nr. 3, s. 419–451.; Laver M., Government termination, *Annual Review of Political Science* 2003, vol. 6, nr. 1, s. 23–40.; Smith A., *Election timing*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 2004.; King G., Alt J., A Unified Model of Cabinet Dissolution in Parliamentary Democracies, *American Journal of Political Science* 1990, vol. 34, nr. 3, s. 846–871.

¹¹ Diermeier D., Stevenson R., Cabinet survival and competing risks, *American Journal of Political Science* 1999, vol. 43, nr. 4, s. 1051–1068.

to dissolve the legislature, if it expresses and confirms a vote of no confidence in the running governmental cabinet (Belarus, Croatia, Georgia, Lithuania, Russia and Serbia were among such European countries as of December 2020, and Poland and Turkey were such cases earlier/historically), the risk of early cabinet termination on the basis of early parliamentary elections is quite significant, especially if the president and the prime minister belong to mutually oppositional parties¹². The fact is that the political and behavioral context of the executive dualism in this case is more problematic, confrontational and complicated, but serves the political presidentialization of the heads of state, who can dismiss cabinet with relative ease¹³. Instead, when the ideological orientations/positions of the governmental cabinet and the president are more similar or tangent, the incentives for conflict within the executive dualism are theoretically and practically reduced, though not completely gone¹⁴. As a result, it is much more difficult for the governmental cabinet to resign and to be terminated in its powers and time.

All of this argues that semi-presidential systems, where presidents can dismiss cabinets, are more “problematic”¹⁵, especially when presidents have significant legislative powers and are able to dissolve legislatures and call early parliamentary elections for various (even discretionary) reasons. The reason is that such powers of presidents contribute to the formation of a mechanism that encourages an unstable structure of appointments and dismissals¹⁶. Quite controversial logic is inherent in semi-presidential countries, where the right to dismiss governmental cabinets is vested exclusively in the legislatures. Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Finland, France, Georgia, Ireland, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia and Ukraine (and historically Armenia and Turkey) were such countries in Europe as of December 2020. The fact is that in this sample of European semi-presidentialism, legislatures can dismiss governmental cabinets, even if presidents do not want this (although in Croatia, Georgia, Lithuania, Serbia and historically in Turkey the president may oppose this, choosing between resignation of governmental cabinet (with the possible formation of new governmental cabinet) and dissolution of the legislature, or

¹² Shugart M., Carey J., *Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1992, s. 125.; Shugart M., Semi-presidential systems: Dual executive and mixed authority patterns, *French Politics* 2005, vol. 3, no 3, s. 333.

¹³ Sartori G., *Comparative Constitutional Engineering. An Inquiry into Structures, Incentives and Outcomes*, London 1997, s. 125; Elgie R., Varieties of Semi-Presidentialism and Their Impact on Nascent Democracies, *Taiwan Journal of Democracy* 2007, vol. 3, nr. 2, s. 57.; Sedelius T., Ekman J., Intra-executive Conflict and Cabinet Instability: Effects of Semi-presidentialism in Central and Eastern Europe, *Government and Opposition* 2010, vol. 45, nr. 4, s. 519.

¹⁴ Protsyk O., Intra-Executive Competition between President and Prime Minister: Patterns of Institutional Conflict and Cooperation under Semi-presidentialism, *Political Studies* 2006, vol. 54, nr. 2, s. 223.; Protsyk O., Politics of Intra-executive Conflict in Semipresidential Regimes in Eastern Europe, *East European Politics and Societies* 2005, vol. 19, nr. 2, s. 135–160.; Skach C., *Borrowing Constitutional Designs. Constitutional Law in Weimar Germany and the French Fifth Republic*, Wyd. Princeton University Press 2005.; Tavits M., *Presidents with Prime Ministers: Do Direct Elections Matter?*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2009.

¹⁵ Shugart M., Carey J., *Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1992, s. 121, 165.

¹⁶ Sedelius T., Ekman J., Intra-executive Conflict and Cabinet Instability: Effects of Semi-presidentialism in Central and Eastern Europe, *Government and Opposition* 2010, vol. 45, nr. 4, s. 505–530.; Strom K., Swindle S., Strategic parliamentary dissolution, *American Political Science Review* 2002, vol. 96, nr. 3, s. 575–591.; Schleiter S., Morgan-Jones E., Constitutional power and competing risks: Monarchs, presidents, prime ministers, and the termination of East and West European cabinets, *American Political Science Review* 2009, vol. 103, nr. 3, s. 496–512.

the legislature cabinedependently be exposed to the risk of dissolution on the basis of current institutional and procedural rules)¹⁷.

Intuitively, this regulates that the peculiarities of governmental cabinets' responsibility in semi-presidential systems depend on the ability of presidents and legislatures to dismiss governmental cabinets, on the ability of presidents to influence the dissolution of the legislatures and on verification whether a particular semi-presidential system of government is determined by the presence or absence of a stable and consistent a parliamentary majority that can or cannot satisfy the president's political priorities and goals. Hypothetically, this implies that in the political and behavioral context of an average semi-presidential country, the possibility, ease, and frequency of early termination of governmental cabinets increases when: presidents have the power to dissolve the legislatures; presidents have the power to dismiss governmental cabinets independently; presidents and prime ministers belong to different and opposing political parties or blocs that are not the members of the government/cabinet coalition. In this context, the constitutional and legal attribution of the responsibility of governmental cabinets under semi-presidentialism is interesting and even decisive one, since it can be defined by the procedures of parliamentary votes of no confidence and confidence in running governmental cabinets (see tables 1 and 2).

¹⁷ Shugart M., Semi-presidential systems: Dual executive and mixed authority patterns, *French Politics* 2005, vol. 3, no 3, s. 333; Samuels D., Shugart M., *Presidents, Parties, and Prime Ministers: How the Separation of Powers Affects Party Organization and Behavior*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 2010, s. 99.

Table 1. Peculiarities and descriptors of the procedures of parliamentary votes of no confidence in running governmental cabinets in the current cases of European semi-presidentialism (as of December 2020)¹⁸

European semi-presidential country	The initiator of a vote of no confidence in cabinet	The object of a vote of no confidence in cabinet	The type of a vote of no confidence in cabinet	The rule of deciding on a vote of no confidence in cabinet	Frequency of declaring a vote of no confidence in cabinet	Consequences of a successful/full vote of no confidence in cabinet	Consequences of a failed/incomplete vote of no confidence in cabinet
Azerbaijan (since 1995)	Parliament	Cabinet	Simple/usual	Absolute majority	–	Raising the question of cabinet's resignation to the president	Confidence in cabinet / dissolution of parliament
Belarus (since 1996)	1/3 of parliament (the lower house)	Cabinet, cabinet program	Simple/usual	Absolute majority (the lower house only)	–	Resignation of cabinet or dissolution of the lower house of parliament	Confidence in cabinet
Bosnia and Herzegovina (since 1995)	Parliament (the lower house)	Cabinet	Simple/usual	Simple (relative) majority / negative majority (the lower house only) ¹⁹	–	Resignation of cabinet	Confidence in cabinet
Bulgaria (since 1991)	1/5 of parliament	Cabinet, prime minister	Simple/usual	Simple (relative) majority	Once in 6 months	Resignation of cabinet	Confidence in cabinet
Croatia (1991–2000)	1/10 of parliament (the lower house)	Cabinet, prime minister	Simple/usual	Absolute majority (the lower house only)	Once in 3 months	Resignation of cabinet or dissolution of parliament	Confidence in cabinet
Croatia (since 2000)	1/50 of parliament	Cabinet, new prime minister and the composition of cabinet	Complicated/constructive or simple/usual	Absolute majority	Once in 6 months	Resignation of cabinet + providing vote of investiture to new cabinet / resignation of cabinet + dissolution of parliament ²⁰	Confidence in cabinet / dissolution of parliament
Czech Republic (since 2012)	1/40 of parliament (the lower house)	Cabinet	Simple/usual	Absolute majority (the lower house only)	–	Resignation of cabinet	Confidence in cabinet
Finland (since 1999)	Parliament	Cabinet	Simple/usual	Simple (relative) majority	–	Resignation of cabinet	Confidence in cabinet

¹⁸ The table is compiled on the basis of databases and constitutions. If we mention the parliament, then in the case of bicameralism we mean the lower house. Otherwise, we make clarifications.

¹⁹ A vote of no confidence in cabinet must be approved by the lower house of parliament by a simple (relative) majority of the MPs present, but not less than by 1/3 of the MPs from each ethnic group. If this is not possible, a vote of no confidence is approved by a negative majority, in particular by the majority of MPs present, provided that the MPs who vote against a vote of no confidence in cabinet are not 2/3 or more of all members of each ethnic group.

²⁰ After the legislature approves a vote of no confidence in the running cabinet, the president initiates the formation of a new cabinet. However, if the legislature is unable to form a new cabinet within 30 days after the vote of no confidence, then the president must dissolve it (recognizing the vote of no confidence) and call early parliamentary election. However, the resignation of the running cabinet and the formation of a new cabinet are delimited in time (in the interval of no more than 30 days). There is also a parliamentary vote of no confidence in an individual member of cabinet. If such a vote of no confidence is successful one, then the prime minister may nominate a new member of the cabinet, but if he or she fails to do so, then the entire cabinet must resign.

Georgia (2004–2013)	1/3 of parliament	Cabinet	Simple/usual	Absolute majority / qualified majority (3/5 of parliament)	Once in 3 / 6 months	Resignation or continuation of cabinet / Resignation of cabinet or dissolution of parliament / Resignation of cabinet ²¹	Confidence in cabinet
Georgia (since 2013)	2/5 of parliament	Cabinet, new prime minister and the composition of cabinet	Complicated/constructive	Absolute majority / qualified majority	Once in 6 months	Resignation of cabinet + nomination of a prime minister + providing vote of investiture to new cabinet ²²	Confidence in cabinet / dissolution of parliament
Ireland (since 1937)	Parliament (the lower house)	Cabinet	Simple/usual	Simple (relative) majority (the lower house only)	–	Resignation of cabinet	Confidence in cabinet
Lithuania (since 1992)	Parliament	Cabinet, prime minister	Simple/usual	Absolute majority	–	Resignation of cabinet or dissolution of parliament	Confidence in cabinet
Moldova (since 2016)	1/4 of parliament	Cabinet	Simple/usual	Absolute majority	–	Resignation of cabinet	Confidence in cabinet
Montenegro (2006–2007)	27 deputies of parliament	Cabinet	Simple/usual	Absolute majority	Once in 3 months	Resignation of cabinet	Confidence in cabinet
Montenegro (since 2007)	27 deputies of parliament	Cabinet	Simple/usual	Absolute majority	Once in 3 months	Resignation of cabinet	Confidence in cabinet
Northern Macedonia (since 1991)	20 deputies of parliament	Cabinet	Simple/usual	Absolute majority	Once in 3 months ²³	Resignation of cabinet	Confidence in cabinet
Poland (1990–1992)	Parliament	Cabinet	Simple/usual	Absolute majority	–	Resignation of cabinet	Confidence in cabinet

²¹ In 2004–2013, Georgia had several options for a vote of no confidence in cabinet. Under normal circumstances, a vote of no confidence in cabinet could be declared by 1/3 and approved by an absolute majority of the legislature. As a result of this, the president was authorized to dismiss or not to dismiss the cabinet if the cabinet continued to function, the legislature within 90–100 days of the previous vote of no confidence could express and approve a new vote of no confidence by an absolute majority. This could result in the resignation of cabinet or the dissolution of parliament at the choice of the president. In addition, once every 6 months, the legislature could issue (by at least 1/3 of its full membership) and approve (by at least 3/5 of its full membership) an unconditional vote of no confidence in cabinet, which should have resulted exclusively in the resignation of cabinet.

²² In parallel with a vote of no confidence in the running cabinet by the parliament, the 2/5 of its full membership must nominate at least one or two candidates for a prime minister, and an absolute majority of the total membership of the legislature after confirmation this procedure must submit it to the president. The president is authorized to accept or reject the candidacy of the new prime minister. If the president approves the prime minister's candidacy, then the legislature must vote on the investiture for the composition of new cabinet. Instead, if the president does not agree to the candidacy of the prime minister, the legislature by at least 3/5 of its full membership must reaffirm it. Only after that, the president is obliged to agree to the candidacy of the prime minister and to ask the legislature to vote on the investiture for the composition of new cabinet. If the parliament during such a constructive vote of no confidence in cabinet is unable to express investiture to the composition of new cabinet, then the president has the right to dissolve the legislature and call its early election.

²³ If a vote of no confidence in the running cabinet is proposed by an absolute majority of the deputies of the legislature, then it can be put on the parliamentary agenda earlier than in 3 months.

Poland (1992–1997)	1/10 of parliament (the lower house)	Cabinet, new prime minister	Complicated/constructive or simple/usual	Absolute majority (the lower house only)	Once in 3 months	Resignation of cabinet + nomination of a prime minister / Resignation of cabinet or dissolution of parliament ²⁴	Confidence in cabinet
Poland (since 1997)	1/10 of parliament (the lower house)	Cabinet, new prime minister	Complicated/constructive or simple/usual	Absolute majority (the lower house only)	Once in 3 months	Resignation of cabinet + nomination of a prime minister / Resignation of cabinet ²⁵	Confidence in cabinet
Romania (since 1991)	1/4 of the two houses of parliament	Cabinet	Simple/usual	Absolute majority (the twohouses)	Once per session	Resignation of cabinet	Confidence in cabinet
Russia (since 1993)	Parliament (the lower house)	Cabinet	Simple/usual	Absolute majority (the lower house only)	Once in 3 months	Resignation or continuation of cabinet / Resignation of cabinet or dissolution of parliament ²⁶	Confidence in cabinet
Serbia (since 2006)	60 deputies of parliament	Cabinet, new composition of cabinet	Complicated/constructive or simple/usual	Absolute majority	Once in 6 months	Resignation of cabinet + providing vote of investiture to new cabinet/resignation of cabinet + dissolution of parliament ²⁷	Confidence in cabinet / dissolution of parliament
Slovakia (since 1999)	1/5 of parliament	Cabinet, prime minister	Simple/usual	Absolute majority	Anytime	Resignation of cabinet	Confidence in cabinet

²⁴ At the same time, there was a vote for the resignation of the running cabinet and for the appointment of a new prime minister. However, if the legislature voted for the resignation of the running cabinet, but did not vote for the appointment of a new prime minister, the president was authorized to accept the resignation of cabinet or to dissolve the lower house of parliament. There was also a procedure for early (earlier than in three months) and repeated vote of no confidence in the same and running cabinet. This required the consent of at least 115 deputies of the lower house of parliament.

²⁵ The legislature simultaneously votes for the resignation of the running cabinet and the nomination of a new prime minister. However, an unsuccessful vote of confidence in the running cabinet or its prime minister can lead to a vote of no confidence in the running cabinet. There is also a procedure for early (earlier than in three months) and repeated vote of no confidence in the same and running cabinet. This requires the consent of at least 115 deputies of the lower house of parliament.

²⁶ Under normal circumstances, a vote of no confidence in cabinet is approved by an absolute majority of the lower house of parliament. As a result of successful vote of no confidence, the president is authorized to dismiss or not to dismiss the cabinet. If the cabinet continues to function, but the legislature expresses and approves a new vote of no confidence in the same cabinet within three months of the previous vote of no confidence, then the president may accept the resignation of cabinet or dissolve the lower house of parliament.

²⁷ After the legislature approves a vote of no confidence in the running cabinet, the president initiates the formation of a new cabinet. However, if the legislature is unable to form a new cabinet within 30 days of the vote of no confidence in the previous cabinet, the president must dissolve the legislature (recognizing the vote of no confidence) and call early parliamentary election. However, the resignation of the running cabinet and the formation of a new cabinet are delimited in time (in the interval of no more than 30 days).

Slovenia (since 1991)	1/9ofparliament (the lower house)	Cabinet, new prime minister and the composition of cabinet	Complicated/constructive	Absolute majority / qualified majority (the lower house only) ²⁸	–	Resignation of cabinet + providing vote of investiture to new cabinet (new prime minister)	Confidence in cabinet
Ukraine (1996–2006)	1/3 of parliament	Cabinet	Simple/usual	Absolute majority	Once per session	Resignation of cabinet	Confidence in cabinet
Ukraine (2006–2010)	1/3 of parliament, president	Cabinet	Simple/usual	Absolute majority	Once per session	Resignation of cabinet	Confidence in cabinet
Ukraine (2010–2014)	1/3 of parliament	Cabinet	Simple/usual	Absolute majority	Once per session	Resignation of cabinet	Confidence in cabinet
Ukraine (since 2014)	1/3 of parliament, president	Cabinet	Simple/usual	Absolute majority	Once per session	Resignation of cabinet	Confidence in cabinet
SEMI-PRESIDENTIAL COUNTRIES WITH NEGATIVE RULES OF CABINET FORMATION (OBTAINING NEGATIVE INVESTITURE VOTES IN CABINETS OR WITHOUT INVESTITURE VOTES IN CABINETS)							
Austria (since 1945)	Parliament (the lower house)	Cabinet	Simple/usual	Simple (relative) majority (the lower house only)	–	Resignation of cabinet	Confidence in cabinet
Finland (1919–1999)	Parliament	Cabinet	Simple/usual	Simple (relative) majority	–	Resignation of cabinet	Confidence in cabinet
France (since 1962)	1/10ofparliament (the lower house)	Cabinet	Simple/usual	Absolute majority (the lower house only)	Once per session	Resignation of cabinet	Confidence in cabinet
Iceland (since 1944)	Parliament	Cabinet	Simple/usual	Absolute majority	–	Resignation of cabinet	Confidence in cabinet
Portugal (1976–1982)	1/4 of the members or any faction of parliament	Cabinet	Simple/usual	Absolute majority	Once per session	Resignation of cabinet	Confidence in cabinet
Portugal (since 1982)	1/4 of the members or any faction of parliament	Cabinet	Simple/usual	Absolute majority	Once per session	Resignation of cabinet	Confidence in cabinet

Zródło: Armington K., Wenger V., Wiedemeier F., Weistanner D., Jiser C., Knöpfel L., Supplement to the Comparative Political Data Set – Government Composition 1960–2015 (36 OECD countries and/or EU-member Countries), Wyd. Institute of Political Science 2017, zródło: <http://www.cps-data.org/index.php/dataChieibub> J. A., Martin S., Rasch B., The Investiture Vote and the Formation of Minority Parliamentary Governments, Paper prepared for presentation at the 7th ECPR general conference, Bordeaux, 4–7 September 2013, 25 s.; Sieberer U., Hire or Fire? The link between cabinet selection and removal in European Democracies, Wyd. University of Konstanz 2012.; Panchak-Bialoblaska N., Utiady menshoshi v yevropskiykh parlamentskiykh demokratiakh, Wyd. Lvivskiy natsionalniy universitet imeni Ivana Franka 2017, s. 148–237.; Lytvyn V., Atrybuty ta riznomydi napriydzdeniskoi systemy pravlinnia v Yevropi: nistryutino-prosesualnyi i politychno-povedinokivnyy aspekty, Wyd. Lvivskiy natsionalniy universitet imeni Ivana Franka 2018, s. 146–181.

²⁸ In the event of a state of emergency or martial law, the approval of a constructive vote of no confidence in cabinet requires the support of at least 2/3 of the nominal membership of the legislature.

Parliamentary votes of no confidence and confidence in running cabinets differ by the fact that the first ones are always directly initiated by legislatures (and sometimes by another political actors/institutions), and the second ones are always directly initiated by running governmental cabinets (including by the prime ministers). Institutional and procedural features/parameters of early termination of powers of governmental cabinets in the conditions of semi-presidentialism, which are incorporated in the votes of no confidence, correlate on the basis of verification of: what are the constitutional and institutional rules for deciding on the resignation of governmental cabinets; what restrictions are imposed on the procedures of votes of no confidence in governmental cabinets; what are the consequences of different types and procedures of votes of no confidence in governmental cabinets. In turn, a vote of confidence in running governmental cabinet, as the right to be initiated only by the latter, can request or verify the confidence of the legislature in any bill or socio-political issue of the governmental cabinet activity, as well as the composition or program of the governmental cabinet and the very fact of the existence of the governmental cabinet, etc. Therefore, as political practice shows, a vote of confidence in running governmental cabinet may or may not be equated to a vote of no confidence in running governmental cabinet and may or may not lead to a vote of no confidence in running governmental cabinet in its legal and political consequences²⁹.

A comparison of the procedural, institutional and procedural features of votes of no confidence in running governmental cabinets in European semi-presidential countries generates the possibility of distinguishing several their classification patterns. Firstly, traditionally, with the exception of Romania, where a vote of no confidence in cabinet must be initiated and confirmed by two houses of parliament at the same time, this is done in other European semi-presidential countries by unicameral parliaments or the lower houses of bicameral parliaments. However, parliaments initiate votes of no confidence in running cabinets in different ways, in particular depending on the share of the membership of legislatures (in order to simplify these requirements), including by: 2/5 of nominal membership – in Georgia, 1/3 of nominal membership – in Belarus, Georgia (until 2013) and Ukraine, 1/4 of nominal membership – in the Czech Republic, Moldova, Portugal and Romania, 1/5 of nominal membership – in Bulgaria, Croatia and Slovakia, 1/9 of nominal membership – in Slovenia, 1/10 of nominal membership – in France and Poland, 60 MPs – in Serbia, 27 MPs – in Montenegro, 20 MPs – in Macedonia, etc. Secondly, running governmental cabinets in actually all European semi-presidential countries, running governmental cabinets or their programs in Belarus, running governmental cabinets or their prime ministers in Bulgaria, Lithuania, Slovakia, running governmental cabinets, their prime ministers and new prime ministers/ministers in Croatia, Georgia, Poland, Serbia and Slovenia are the subjects of votes of no confidence. Accordingly, with the exception of Croatia (since 2000), Georgia (since 2013), Poland (since 1992), Serbia and

²⁹ Strom K., Müller W., Bergman T., *Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2003.; Laver M., Shepsle K., *Government Accountability in Parliamentary Democracy*, [w:] Przeworski A., Stokes S., Manin B. (eds.), *Democracy, Accountability, And Representation*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1999, s. 279–281.

Slovenia, where there are complicated/constructive votes of no confidence in running governmental cabinets or procedural variations close to them, all the other European semi-presidential countries use simple/usual votes of no confidence in governmental cabinets, which supplementally do not require the expression of investiture in alternative/new governmental cabinets. Thirdly, the rules for deciding on parliamentary votes of no confidence in governmental cabinets in the analyzed European semi-presidential countries also differ and are divided into the following groups, where there are used: the absolute or qualified majority systems – in Georgia and Slovenia; exclusively the absolute majority system – in Azerbaijan, Belarus, Croatia, Czech Republic, France, Iceland, Lithuania, Moldova, Montenegro, Northern Macedonia, Poland, Portugal, Romania (by two houses of the parliament), Russia, Serbia, Slovakia and Ukraine; exclusively the simple (relative) majority system – in Austria, Bulgaria, Finland and Ireland; the simple (relative) or negative majority systems – in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Finally, the most common consequence of a successful vote of no confidence in running governmental cabinet in European semi-presidential countries is the resignation of governmental cabinet, less often one – the resignation of the running governmental cabinet and providing vote of investiture to new governmental cabinet, and the least often one – the resignation of governmental cabinet or the dissolution of parliament (see table 1 for details).

In turn, a comparison of procedural, institutional and procedural attributes of votes of confidence in running governmental cabinets in European semi-presidential countries (see table 2 for details) generates the conclusion that such a phenomenon is not typical for Austria, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia (since 2013), Iceland, Lithuania and Ukraine and was not typical for Poland until 1997, although his typical of this country at present. The absence of parliamentary vote of confidence in running cabinets automatically weakens the potential of cabinet responsibility to legislatures, but also the possibility of “pressure” of governmental cabinets and prime ministers on the majority (and personal composition) in legislatures. Instead, in European semi-presidential countries, where votes of confidence in running governmental cabinets are in place, they are initiated either exclusively by cabinets, exclusively by prime ministers and by cabinets or prime ministers by their choice. Parliamentary votes of confidence in running governments almost always check the assessment of cabinets’ work and productivity, less often – the adoption or non-adoption of cabinets’ bills, and the least often – the assessment of the programs or compositions of governmental cabinets. According to the rules of decision on votes of confidence in running governmental cabinets, all European semi-presidential countries, where these procedures are regulated currently or have been regulated earlier, should be divided into the following groups, where there are or were used: the absolute majority system – Belarus, Croatia, Czech Republic, Georgia (until 2013), Moldova, Montenegro, Northern Macedonia, Romania (by two houses), Russia, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia; the simple (relative) majority system – Bulgaria, Finland, Ireland and Poland (since 1997); the negative majority system – France and Portugal.

Table 2. Peculiarities and descriptors of the procedures of parliamentary votes of confidence in running governmental cabinets in the current cases of European semi-presidentialism (as of December 2020)³⁰

European semi-presidential country	The initiator of a vote of confidence in cabinet	The question or object of a vote of confidence in cabinet	The rule of deciding on a vote of confidence in cabinet	Consequences of a successful vote of confidence in cabinet or of failure to consider a vote of confidence in cabinet	Consequences of an unsuccessful vote of confidence (denial of confidence) in cabinet	Confirmation of the consequences of the denial of confidence in cabinet by another political institution
SEMI-PRESIDENTIAL COUNTRIES WITH POSITIVE RULES OF CABINET FORMATION (OBTAINING POSITIVE INVESTITURE VOTES IN CABINETS)						
Azerbaijan (since 1995)	–	–	–	–	–	–
Belarus (since 1996)	Prime minister	Cabinet / cabinet program / bills	Absolute majority (the lower house only)	Continuation of cabinet / change of the cabinet program / adoption of the law	Resignation of cabinet or dissolution of parliament	Yes; president
Bosnia and Herzegovina (since 1995)	–	–	–	–	–	–
Bulgaria (since 1991)	Cabinet	Cabinet / cabinet program / bills	Simple (relative) majority	Continuation of cabinet / change of the cabinet program / adoption of the law	Resignation of cabinet	No
Croatia (1991–2000)	Prime minister	Cabinet	Absolute majority (the lower house only)	Continuation of cabinet	Resignation of cabinet	No
Croatia (since 2000)	Prime minister	Cabinet	Absolute majority	Continuation of cabinet	Resignation of cabinet or dissolution of parliament	Yes; president + prime minister
Czech Republic (since 2012)	Prime minister / cabinet	Bills	Absolute majority (the lower house only)	Adoption of the law or the possibility of dissolving parliament	Vote of no confidence in cabinet / non-adoption of the law	No
Finland (since 1999)	Prime minister / cabinet	Cabinet / bills	Simple (relative) majority	Continuation of cabinet / adoption of the law	Resignation of cabinet	No
Georgia (2004–2013)	Prime minister, president ³¹	Cabinet / cabinet composition / bills	Absolute majority	Continuation of cabinet / clarification of the cabinet composition / adoption of the law	Resignation of cabinet or dissolution of parliament	Yes; president

³⁰ The table is compiled on the basis of databases and constitutions. If we mention the parliament, then in the case of bicameralism we mean the lower house. Otherwise, we make clarifications.

³¹ In 2004–2013, the Georgian president was required to test parliamentary confidence in the running cabinet if, for the first time since the cabinet was formed, at least 1/3 (but not less than 5 ministers) of its membership have changed.

Georgia (since 2013)	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Ireland (since 1937)	Prime minister	Cabinet	Simple (relative) majority (the lower house only)	Continuation of cabinet	Resignation of cabinet	Resignation of cabinet	No
Lithuania (since 1992)	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Moldova (since 2016)	Cabinet	Cabinet / cabinet program / bills	Absolute majority	Continuation of cabinet / change of the cabinet program / adoption of the law	Resignation of cabinet	Resignation of cabinet	No
Montenegro (2006–2007)	Cabinet	Cabinet	Absolute majority	Continuation of cabinet	Resignation of cabinet	Resignation of cabinet	No
Montenegro (since 2007)	Cabinet	Cabinet	Absolute majority	Continuation of cabinet	Resignation of cabinet	Resignation of cabinet	No
Northern Macedonia (since 1991)	Cabinet	Cabinet	Absolute majority	Continuation of cabinet	Resignation of cabinet	Resignation of cabinet	No
Poland (1990–1992)	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Poland (1992–1997)	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Poland (since 1997)	Prime minister	Cabinet	Simple (relative) majority (the lower house only)	Continuation of cabinet	Resignation of cabinet	Resignation of cabinet	No
Romania (since 1991)	Cabinet	Cabinet / cabinet program / bills	Absolute majority (the two houses)	Continuation of cabinet / change of the cabinet program / adoption of the law	Resignation of cabinet	Resignation of cabinet	No
Russia (since 1993)	Prime minister	Cabinet	Absolute majority (the lower house only)	Continuation of cabinet	Resignation of cabinet or dissolution of parliament	Resignation of cabinet or dissolution of parliament	Yes; president
Serbia (since 2006)	Cabinet	Cabinet / bills	Absolute majority	Continuation of cabinet / adoption of the law	Resignation of cabinet + vote of investiture in new cabinet / resignation of cabinet + dissolution of parliament	Resignation of cabinet + vote of investiture in new cabinet / resignation of cabinet + dissolution of parliament	No
Slovakia (since 1999)	Prime minister / cabinet	Cabinet / cabinet program or composition / bills	Absolute majority	[Continuation of cabinet / change of the cabinet program or composition / adoption of the law] or the possibility of dissolving parliament	Resignation of cabinet / non-change of the cabinet program or composition / non-adoption of the law	Resignation of cabinet / non-change of the cabinet program or composition / non-adoption of the law	No

Slovenia (since 1991)	Prime minister	Cabinet / bills	Absolute majority (the lower house only)	Continuation of cabinet / adoption of the law	Resignation of cabinet + vote of investiture in new cabinet or in the event of a re-vote resignation of cabinet + dissolution of parliament / non-adoption of the law	Yes; president
Ukraine (1996–2006)	–	–	–	–	–	–
Ukraine (2006–2010)	–	–	–	–	–	–
Ukraine (2010–2014)	–	–	–	–	–	–
Ukraine (since 2014)	–	–	–	–	–	–
SEMI-PRESIDENTIAL COUNTRIES WITH NEGATIVE RULES OF CABINET FORMATION (OBTAINING NEGATIVE INVESTITURE VOTES IN CABINETS OR WITHOUT INVESTITURE VOTES IN CABINETS)						
Austria (since 1945)	–	–	–	–	–	–
Iceland (since 1944)	–	–	–	–	–	–
Portugal (1976–1982)	Cabinet	Cabinet / bills	Negative majority	Continuation of cabinet / adoption of the law	Resignation of cabinet or dissolution of parliament	Yes; president
Portugal (since 1982)	Cabinet	Cabinet / bills	Negative majority	Continuation of cabinet / adoption of the law	Resignation of cabinet	No
Finland (1919–1999)	Prime minister / cabinet	Cabinet / bills	Simple (relative) majority	Continuation of cabinet / adoption of the law	Resignation of cabinet / non-adoption of the law	No
France (since 1962)	Prime minister / cabinet	Cabinet / cabinet program / bills	Negative majority ³²	Continuation of cabinet / change of the cabinet program / adoption of the law	Resignation of cabinet	No

Zdrojlo: Armington K., Wenger V., Wiedemeier F., Weisstanner D., Isler C., Knöpfel L., *Supplement to the Comparative Political Data Set – Government Composition 1960–2015 (36 OECD countries and/or EU-member countries)*, Wyd. Institute of Political Science 2017, zdrojlo: <http://www.cpis-data.org/index.php/data>; Cheibub J. A., Martin S., Rasch B., *The Investiture Vote and the Formation of Minority Parliamentary Governments*; Paper prepared for presentation at the 7th ECPR general conference, Bordeaux, 4–7 September 2013, 25 s.; Sieberer U., *Hire or Fire? The link between cabinet selection and removal in European Democracies*, Wyd. University of Konstanz 2012; Panchak-Bialoblotska N., *Utrady mershoshi v yevropejskikh parlamentskikh demokraciakh*, Wyd. Lvivskiy natsionalnyj universytet imeni Ivana Franka 2017, s. 148–237; Lytvyn V., *Atybuty ta riznomydi napriyrezidenskoj systemy pravlinnia v Yevropi: instyutsiino-pratsesualnyj i politychno-povedinokovy aspekty*, Wyd. Lvivskiy natsionalnyj universytet imeni Ivana Franka 2018, s. 146–181.

³² A vote of confidence in cabinet on a financial bill or a social security bill is considered successful if the lower house of parliament does not initiate a vote of no confidence in the cabinet within 24 hours of the vote of confidence in cabinet.

Usually, the result of vote of confidence in running governmental cabinet is a positive decision on the issue of this vote initiation. Instead, if a vote of confidence in running governmental cabinet is not considered in time, as in the case of Slovakia and Czechia, then this may be the basis for the dissolution of the legislature. In turn, the refusal of legislature in vote of confidence in governmental cabinet traditionally resulted in the resignation of cabinet, less often – in the resignation of cabinet or the dissolution of parliament, much less often – in the resignation of the running cabinet and giving a vote of investiture to new cabinet or in the resignation of cabinet and the dissolution of parliament, and finally the least often – in raising the question about a vote of no confidence in running cabinet. In most countries, with the exception of Belarus, Croatia, Georgia (until 2013), Portugal (in 1976–1982), Russia and Slovenia, the confirmation of the effects of vote of confidence’s denial in parliament by other political institutions is unnecessary.

In general, the mutual imposition of institutional and procedural attributes of different options of governmental cabinet responsibility in European semi-presidential countries suggests that the influence of diverse political institutions is variative in this process. A reflection of this is the comparison and correlation of the procedural complexity of the rules of decision-making on parliamentary votes of no confidence and confidence in running governmental cabinets, with the assumptions that: a) the complication of the rules of adopting a vote of no confidence in running governmental cabinet on the part of the legislature weakens the government-formation power of the latter; b) the complication of the rules of adopting a vote of confidence in running cabinet by the legislature strengthens the government-formation power of the latter.

Table 3. Groups of current cases of European semi-presidentialism based on the correlation of the procedural complexity of parliamentary responsibility (parliamentary votes of no confidence and confidence) of running governmental cabinets (as of December 2020)

The rules for deciding on different types of parliamentary votes in running governmental cabinets in terms of their parliamentary responsibility (in order to weaken the powers of legislatures regarding possible resignations of governmental cabinets under semi-presidentialism)	The examples of European semi-presidential countries
A vote of no confidence – a simple (relative) majority, a vote of confidence – a simple (relative) majority	Bulgaria, Finland, Ireland
A vote of no confidence – a simple (relative) majority, a vote of confidence – missing	Austria, Bosnia and Herzegovina
A vote of no confidence – an absolute majority, a vote of confidence – a simple (relative) majority	Poland
A vote of no confidence – an absolute majority, a vote of confidence – an absolute majority	Armenia, Belarus, Croatia, Czech Republic, Georgia, Moldova, Montenegro, Northern Macedonia, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia
A vote of no confidence – an absolute majority, a vote of confidence – a negative majority	France, Portugal
A vote of no confidence – an absolute majority, a vote of confidence – missing	Azerbaijan, Iceland, Lithuania, Ukraine

Zródło: Own correlations based on tables 1 and 2. Simplifying the procedural rules of votes of no confidence in running governmental cabinets and complicating the procedural rules of votes of confidence in running governmental cabinets increases parliamentary responsibility of governmental cabinets under semi-presidentialism.

With regard to electoral risks and features of the responsibility of governmental cabinets under semi-presidentialism, then they traditionally relate to the expected results of early parliamentary elections in the context of governmental cabinets' resignations, as well as the electoral systems used to do so. If the electoral system (used for the formation of the legislature in any semi-presidential country) affects the number of parliamentary parties and therefore the fractionalization/fragmentation of the legislature, then it affects the parliamentary unity and hence the possibility of early resignation of governmental cabinet. Therefore, when the greater is the number of parties and the greater is the fractionalization of parliament, then the greater is the likelihood of early resignation of governmental cabinet, especially if each party of cabinet is endowed with veto-powers³³. Similarly, when the smaller is the number of parties or the larger is the number of parties in the conditions of presence of a dominant party, then the less likely is that the governmental cabinet will resign early, since a much smaller is the number of parties, which have veto powers. Since the relationship between the electoral system and the party system is relevant one (in particular, according to Duverger's law³⁴), then it inevitably designs inter-institutional relations under semi-presidentialism and therefore affects the peculiarities of responsibility of governmental cabinets under this system of government. By these logics, parliamentary and intra-party unity and centripetal tendencies in the party system increase, but the probability of resignation of governmental cabinets under semi-presidentialism decreases, when the electoral systems of legislatures are associated not with multi-member, but with single-member constituencies³⁵. The reason is that the electoral system with single-member constituencies increases the chances that the legislature will be dominated by a disciplined party or coalition that has the ability to "boycott" governmental cabinet bills, and therefore this and other parties should not raise the issue of no confidence in the prime minister or governmental cabinet in general. In turn, the electoral system with multi-member constituencies is more likely to promote multipartyism, when coalition formation is "expensive" one and majority in the legislature is fragmented one. As a result, raising the issue of a vote of no confidence in governmental cabinet or denial in a vote of confidence in governmental cabinet almost always does not lead to a significantly different electoral and party result. It is also interesting that electoral and non-electoral risks of early terminations of powers of governmental cabinets under of semi-presidentialism can be combined together³⁶.

³³ Lin J.-W., *The Rules of Electoral Competition and the Accountability of Semi-Presidential Governments*, [w:] Elgie R., Moestrup S., Wu Y.-S. (eds.), *Semi-Presidentialism and Democracy*, Wyd. Palgrave 2011, s. 61–80.

³⁴ Duverger M., *Political parties: Their organization and activity in the modern state*, Wyd. Wiley 1963, s. 217, 239.

³⁵ Lin J.-W., *The Rules of Electoral Competition and the Accountability of Semi-Presidential Governments*, [w:] Elgie R., Moestrup S., Wu Y.-S. (eds.), *Semi-Presidentialism and Democracy*, Wyd. Palgrave 2011, s. 61–80.; Downs A., *An Economic Theory of Democracy*, Wyd. Harper 1957.

³⁶ Arter D., From the "rainbow coalition" back down to "red earth"? The 2003 Finnish general election, *West European Politics* 2003, vol. 26, nr. 3, s. 153–162.; Coakley J., *The foundations of statehood*, [w:] Coakley J., Gallagher M. (eds.), *Politics in the Republic of Ireland*, Wyd. Routledge 1999, s. 1–31.; Fernandes J., Magalhães S., Government survival in semi-presidential regimes, *European Journal of Political Research* 2016, vol. 55, nr. 1, s. 61–80.

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